PPP plus by Kox, H.L.M.
ET 
ylleit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie 
05348 
1994 
033erie Research Memoranda 
PPP Plus: Towards Full Resource Pricing for LDC Primary Exports 
Henk LM. Kox 
Research Memorandum 1994-36 
October 1994 
vrije Universiteit amsterdam W 

PPP PLUS: TOWARDSFULL RESOURCE PRICING 
FORLDCPRMARYEXPORTS 
HenkL.M.Kox* 
Summarv: Internalisalion of environmental costs through the Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP) is 
widely enconraged. This guiding principle nonnally assumes that real, additional environmental 
costs can be passed on to consumers (User Pays). Application of a PPP policy may be difficult for 
industries which export a large share of their production. If competition in export markets is such 
that additional production costs due to environmental measures cannot be passed on to interna-
tional consumers, the profit margin on export commodities is eroded and export is consequently 
discouraged. This situation prevails for many primary export commodities of developing coun-
tries. Since the latter countries depend strongly on those exports, implementation of environmen-
tal policy in primary export sectors will be very problematic when the incremental production 
costs due to such measures are substantial, Only international regulatory arrangements can re-
store the principle that consumers should in principle bear the full resource costs of the commodi-
ties they demand, and thus create a necessary precondition for domestic environmental policy in 
developing countries. The paper describes International Commodity-Related Environmental 
Agreements as potentially useful instruments to strengthen the internalisation of environmental 
costs. 
Introduction 
Both trade theorists and environmentalists consider internalisation of environmental 
costs in normal market prices as a desirable goal. In OECD countries and in a number 
of developing countries practical policy steps have taken to implement this goal, at 
least for some resources and environmental costs. OECD countries in 1972 adopted a 
set of guidelines incorporating the so-called Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) as the basis 
for shaping their environmental policies (OECD 1972; 1975). Since then broad interna-
tional agreement has grown about the usefulness of these PPP guidelines, and not only 
in developed countries. In Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration all countries are called 
upon to apply the 'Polluter Pays' Principle as a guiding principle for their environmen-
tal policy: 
'National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs 
and the use of economie instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and 
without distorting international trade and investment' (UNCED 1992). 
The Polluter-Pays Principle is only offers directional guidance in policy development. 
An environmental policy on the basis of PPP may face several practical problems, and 
moreover, is not without costs, both with regard to policy implementation and with 
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regard to the concomitant changes in consumption patterns and economie structure. 
Aspects .of international competitiveness for industries facing PPP policies constantly 
loom large. For these reasons, environmental policies in OECD countries still do not 
systématically apply PPP in all relevant areas (e.g. Opschoor & Vos 1989). In develop-
ing countries, the internalisation of environmental costs through the PPP is still in its 
very infancy (e.g. Biggs 1993). 
The question which will be asked in this paper is whether all 'Rio countries' can indeed 
be expected to implement PPP policies. Do the latter really fit their possibilities and 
current interests? This paper dissent with this view. It will be argued that for many 
developing countries the income effects and international competitiveness 
issues are very real obstacles to a consequent implementation of the PPP. To substan-
tiate the intentions stated in the Rio Declaration additional international regulatory 
and financial arrangements will be required. This proposition will be further developed 
with regard to the internalisation of environmental costs in the prices of primary export 
commodities. International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements will be 
described as potentially useful instruments to achieve internalisation of environmental 
costs and substantiate broad promises made at Rio. 
PoïluterPays and/or UserPays? 
If the price of a good or service does not, or incompletely, incorporate the costs of 
environmental inputs into its production and the welfare costs of pollution created by 
its production, we say that there are production externalities. In more general terms, an 
environmental externality is an effect of one economie agent's production or consump-
tion activity on the consumption or production possibilities of other economie agents. 
The latter may include current and/or future local population in the production area, 
people downstream a river, the whole national population, or even people outside the 
production country. The existence of environmental externalities implies that costs and 
market prices do not reflect relative environmental scarcities and social preferences 
with regard to the environment. Such incorrect prices are likely to produce inefficiënt 
allocation of commercial and natural resources, both nationally and internationally. 
To end this situation, the environmental damage can be 'repaired', avoided or com-
pensated. Box 1 sketches the main issues. PPP guidelines state that producers must be 
charged for the environmental costs they inflict upon a community or upon other pri-
vate persons. Though the term 'Polluter Pays' could be understood as if only compen-
sation issues are addressed, the OECD guidelines explicitly include pollution preven-
tion and control measures. 
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Box I: The internalisation problem 
Suppose that production of a given commodity creates negative net externalities to 'third par-
ties', and that most of them are related to pollution emission. Suppose further that production 
of the commodity in each period (yt) causes the emission of a fixed quantity of homogeneous 
pollutants (qt), with a representing the proportionality factor: 
qt = « yt (0 
Let environmental quality in the production region be summarised in a single index variable E . 
The change in environmental quality is affected by three factors: pollution emission from 
commodity production, the pollution emission from other economie activities, and the regener-
ative process of nature. Pollution from other sources (q*) and nature's regenerative process 
( R ) are considered as given. The annual change in environmental quality can thus be formu-
lated in the following form: 
*t ' Et-1 = • a1 <k - *Z 1? + °3 *t = " °1 a >t • °2 %* + 0 3 *t ("a) 
with (a. ,Q-,a, > 0 ). Now suppose further that society has avoidance or reparation activity At 
at its disposal to minimise the negative environmental effects of pollution. With ( 0^ > 0 ) 
equation (iia) becomes: 
E t - E t-i = - flia yt - °z $ +aiRt +Q4 *t w 
If the social objective is that environmental damage from commodity production should be 
completely neutralised, the following quantitative relation must exist between commodity 
production and avoidance/repair activity. 
\ = (a, « /a 4 )y t + (o, q^ -Qj 1^) /a 4 (///) 
or, per commodity unit: d A / d y = (a. o ) / a , (/v) 
Now suppose that the cost of one unit of avoidance activity is pa. Full cost internalisation of 
externalities requires that the private unit cost price of production is elevated with the addition-
al pollution avoidance or abatement costs. In that case, the private cost price ( p ) equals the 
social cost price (ps): 
Pp + (a, o /a 4 ) pa = ps (va) 
Of course, a society may decide not to insist on complete eradication of pollution, and to accept 
monetary compensation for the welfare loss due to the remaining pollution. The compensation 
amount could be derived by subjective, demand derived valuation methods, such as the revealed 
preferences method or the contingent valuation method. The compensation amount can be a 
direct transfer to affected private parties or a public tax. Suppose that fi represents the part of 
pollution to be abated, and Z t is the required monetary compensation for the remaining pollu-
tion. Now the relation between social and private cost prices can be described by: 
Pp + O* ( «H « /Q4)Pa + ( ^ / '*)! = Ps (v&) 
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Under a PPP policy producers have to pay for emissions, for non-complying with 
environmental standards, and for the use of natural resources. They will react in two 
ways to such a policy. First, they will try to limit the damage-causing activity by choos-
ing better production methods. This is an incentive for environmental efficiency and 
innovation. Secondly, they will pass on the additional production costs to their custom-
ers. Ultimately, the final consumers will pay for the full resource costs of the commodi-
ties they demand, including the additional environmental costs. Competition ensures 
that the consumer is not charged too much, and that producers choose efficiënt tech-
nologies.^ In this situation the PPP thus resolves into the User Pays Principle. The 
OECD guidelines explicitly acknowledge that 'from the view of conformity with the 
Polluter-Pays Principle, it does not matter whether the polluter passes on to his prices 
some or all of the environmental costs, or absorbs them'.2^ The User Pays Principle is 
sometimes also referred to as resource pricing or full resource pricing. In an informal 
document on proper pricing methods for natural resources the OECD Secretariat 
defines the User-Pays Principle as follows: '[T]he price for the use of a resource should 
be the full long-run marginal costs of using that resource including the external costs 
associated with its development and any resultant pollution prevention and control 
activities' (OECD 1988, in Dommen 1993:149-155). 
So far this is all nice theory for a closed economy. A major underlying precondi-
tion is that comparable producers are confronted with identical policy. Stated other-
wise, there must be unity of policy. If the latter precondition is not fulfilled, then - all 
other things being equal - producers facing a tough environmental policy are put at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to those producers which face a more lenient 
environmental policy. In the end a lenient policy will drive out the tough policy through 
competitive forces. To guarantee unity of policy is mostly not too problematic in a 
national economy. Problems arise, however, in the international market. Here export-
ers have to compete with companies operating under different national policy regimes. 
In the world market national jurisdictions of sovereign governments prevail. Unity of 
policy is here an illusion due to the general lack of supranational structures and inter-
governmental co-ordination. 
Internaüsation of environmental costs for export commodities 
Most small economies cannot influence the world market for their export products. So, 
if PPP causes a substantial rise in production costs, the exporters cannot expect to 
1) In a competitive market, where all producers face a cost increase due to the introduction of PPP, a new equilibrium will be 
established at a higher price level, close to the new production costs of the most efficiënt producers. 
2) As stated in the supplementary notes (para 3) to the guidelines (OECD 1972). 
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recoup these costs from their international buyers. The necessary complementarity 
between environmental policy for domestic-oriented and export-oriented sectors comes 
under pressure. Very often producers produce by the same production methods identi-
cal goods for the domestic and the export industry. When a PPP policy induces higher 
production costs, it creates strange anomalies when only the supply price in the domes-
tic market can be raised while producers themselves have to absorb the cost rise for 
export products. If only for credibility reasons, a complementarity in treatment of both 
is required. When only one group of consumers is charged for the additional environ-
mental costs, this will sooner or later undermine the domestic credibility of environ-
mental policy.^ 
For large exporters the situation is different. They have some degree of monopoly 
power and their action will influence the world market price. With inelastic demand 
they can pass on the cost increase without a proportional loss of demand volume. The 
reaction patterns of other countries can, however, be such that in the longer term the 
initial advantage of the large exporting country is annihilated. Policy margins for indi-
vidual exporting countries will thus converge in the long term. 
The implication is that the User Pays Principle does not work for exports, certainly not 
for exporters with small market shares. Unilateral introduction of a PPP policy can 
thus create substantial difficulties for a country's export industry.2^ Profit margins in 
the export sector shrink and exports become less attractive. The producer's normal 
reaction to a lower margin on export sales is to channel his products to the domestic 
market, or if this is not possible, to diminish export production and seek for income 
alteraatives. Without further intervention, this effect may undermine the whole PPP-
based environmental policy towards the industry involved. In developing countries, 
primary exports are often of utmost importance because they are the main commercial 
source of foreign exchange. 
What can a government do to pursue its domestic environmental policy, while at 
the same time maintaining export levels? To avoid a lower export supply it has to 
financially compensate the domestic export producers through subsidies or border tax 
adjustment. In the first case the governments subsidises the export producers for the 
use of particular production methods, e.g. by channelling back environmental tax 
levied earlier, and/or by supplying 'fresh' (additional) subsidies. Border tax adjust-
1) Domestic consumers are likely to regard a differential treatment as merely a form of taxation or suppression of domestic 
demand. Conversely, suppose a government would ask for international support for internalisation of environmental externalities 
in the price of export commodities, while failing to achieve internalisation in domestic prices. The international community will 
regard such an inconsistent policy as merely a form of rent-seizing. The significance of the complementarity argument depends, of 
course, on the export share in a country's total production. 
2) The trade effects of unilateral environmental policy in a small open economies are well-documented in trade literature (e.g. 
Grubel 1976; Siebert 1977). 
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ments would correct for international differences in the level of environmental taxes 
which producers of a particular commodity have to pay. Exporters receive border tax 
rebates (refunds) for emission charges or other environmental taxes levied before. As a 
corollary, the adjustments can also apply to competing imports. 
What can be said about the desirability of these compensatory measures? From a 
fiscal point of view they are less desirable. They form an additional burden for gov-
ernment finance, while many developing countries are wrestling with short-term fiscal 
deficits and austerity measures under structural adjustment programmes. Only refund-
ing of earlier levied environmental taxes does not violate fiscal constraints. More 
serious are the objections from the point of view of environmental internalisation. The 
result of the compensatory measures is that foreign consumers continue to pay a price 
below full resource costs. Box 2 refines the concept of the hidden welfare transfer to 
foreign buyers due to underpriced export goods. A final objection relates to effect of 
the compensatory measures on international allocative efficiency. The measures in fact 
Box 2: Hidden international welfare subsidies due to underpricing 
Suppose like in Box 1 (equation va ), that all environmental damage is to be neutralised in-
stead of financially compensated. Assume this internalisation is achieved for the commodities 
sold in the domestic market, but that producers cannot pass on the cost increase in the form of 
a higher export supply price. The amount of the hidden welfare subsidy to foreign consumers 
( ATHt) can then be described as: 
NHt = [(a, « / o 4 ) P a ] \ yt (rf), 
in which /L is the export share of production. The export share depends inter alia on the prof-
itability of exports. Hence, the export share is inversely related to (a^ a/a^)pa . To counter-
vail its export-lowering effect, the required export subsidy would have to compensate this at the 
border, so that most of N is perpetuated. 
imply that the gains from trade are 'bought' by subsidies, so that net gains may be low 
or even negative. The compensating border measures induce a 'beggar-thy-neighbour' 
effect and a downward harrnonisation of environmental policy standards. National 
governments would be inclined to use commodity-specific or industry-specific measures 
to offset the influence of domestic environmental policy on the international competi-
tiveness of their firms and industries (e.g. Walter 1974; Richardson & Mutti 1976). This 
could easily evolve into an inextricable jumble of compensating measures at the bor-
der, with damaging effects for international trade. With an increasingly integrated 
world trade and an increasing importance of environmental policy this effect is loom-
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ing large. Current GATT rules discourage and in some cases forbid the use of subsidies 
to help domestic sectors meet environmental requirements,^ but it is likely that the 
new WTO organisation in the future will have to spend considerable amounts of time 
to these problems. The common ground for international trade and environment 
problems will have to better demarcated. The most urgent motivation which led 
OECD countries to agreement on the PPP guidelines as early as 1972, was related to 
trade policy rather than to environmental issues as such. The guidelines were meant to 
prevent a broad-scale application of subsidies and tax exemptions for pollution control. 
This preoccupation is reflected in the name of the original PPP agreement, 'Guiding 
Principles Concerning the International Economie Aspects of Environmental Policies'. 
The 1972 PPP guidelines are as much a trade agreement than an agreement on the 
principles of environmental policy.^ 
The international competition effects of PPP policies remain problematic. A 
broad-scale use of subsidies and compensating border measures is unlikely for fiscal 
reasons, at least in developing countries, and undesirable for environmental and alloca-
tive efficiency reasons. Introduction of PPP policies in developing countries is unlikely 
when their adoption would cause a substantial rise in production costs. 
Primary commodity exports and environmental externalities 
The relevance of these general issues can be shown with regard to primary commodity 
exports of developing countries. Notwithstanding the fast industrialisation of many 
parts of the developing world, primary commodity exports like food commodities, 
agricultural raw materials, metals and minerals, and fuels, are the main export compo-
nent for a vast majority of less-developed countries (LDCs). In 1991 the average 
primary commodity share in merchandise exports amounted to 68 per cent in the low-
income countries (excluding India and China), while it was on average 56 per cent in 
the lower-middle income countries (World Bank 1993: 268-9). Moreover, many de-
veloping countries are highly dependent on a small number of primary export commod-
ities. A group of 76 LDCs depended on average for more than fifty per cent of their 
export earnings on three or less primary commodities in the period 1987-1989. LDC 
market shares are often very small (UNCTAD 1992: 227-8). Currently, the direct 
1) Articles VI.3, VIS, XVI and the Subsidies Code declare all subsidies subject to countervailing action by other nations. Just a 
limited section of subsidies is agreed upon as 'non-actionable'. In the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Arti-
cle 8.2c) governments are permitted to fund up to 20 per cent of one-time capital investments needed to meet new environmental 
requirements. Further elements of the new GATT/WTO agreement are that export subsidies for manufactured goods are com-
pletely forbidden and that agricultural export subsidies are to be reduced. With regard to border tax adjustments GATT only 
allows adjustments for (consumer) taxes on Products, but not for taxes on production processes. even though the latter would be 
more desirable from an environmental policy point of view (e.g. Jackson 1992:194-197,255-273; GATT 1991; Esty 1994:168-171). 
2) Several of its articles (1, 9,11,13) explicitiy refer to GATT provisions: national treatment, non-use of import levies and export 
rebates to compensate for inter-country differences in environmental policy, avoiding non-tariff barriers to trade. 
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contribution of primary exports to GNP averages at nearly twenty per cent in Subsaha-
ra Africa and eight per cent in South and Central America. 
Production of primary commodities often forms an important cause of environ-
mental degradation. A summary of empirical findings for six commodity groups is given 
in an annex to this paper. Till now only very few studies exist which try to quantify the 
magnitude of environmental externalities and, hence, real resource costs of commodity 
production in LDCs. On the basis of existing data - although the available studies often 
use different techniques, relate to different years, and vary in the quality of underlying 
research - Pearce & Warford (1993:28) make the guesstimate that total gross envi-
ronmental damage in poor developing countries may be around 10 per cent of GDP 
and above. Even though the empirical basis for this generalisation is weak, it can safely 
be assumed that the economie implications of environmental externalities are non-
trivial. A recent study on cotton has shown that production costs per unit (i.e. including 
yield effects) may rise with 30 per cent and more, compared to current 'Standard' 
production costs, when the environmental externalities are to be abated (De Vries 
1994). Estimates of the additional costs of avoiding water pollution in the Canadian 
non-ferro metal extraction averaged around ten per cent (Blunden 1985). A number of 
existing empirical studies are related to the consequences of deforestation, or to soil 
erosion in semi-arid regions like the Sahel or some other parts of Africa.^ Causality 
relations between environmental damage and commodity production are seldom 
straightforward. Non-trade causes of deforestation, like fuelwood needs for the local 
community or land clearance for agricultural purposes, are often even more important 
causes than timber extraction for export. The same accounting problem often exists in 
studies on local agriculture and overgrazing by livestock. These activities are as a rule 
not the only causes of erosion and land degradation. With these provisos in mind, it is 
possible to present some data on the economie importance of environmental degrada-
tion in commodity-producing LDCs. Table 1, basically an amended summary of exist-
ing study by Pearce and Warford (1993), reproduces estimates of actual environmental 
damage in terrns of the gross domestic product of selected countries. 
Before entering discussion on the possibilities of PPP policies with regard to LDC 
primary exports, it is important to point at two factors which influence the decision 
context of private commodity producers, and hence, also the ecological record of 
commodity production. The first is the role of current 'non-environmental' government 
policies. It is well-documented (e.g. World Bank 1992) that some policies, like 
productivity-enhancing measures, create disincentives for environmental protection, or 
1) On the costs of deforestation, see e.g. Repetto et al. 1987 (Indonesia); WRI1990 (Costa Rica); Paris & Ruzicka 1991 (Philip-
pines). On soil erosion in African regions, see e.g. Bishop & Allen 1989; Mortimore 1989; Magrath & Arens 1989. 
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Table 1: Estimates of environmental damage in selected LDCs, various years 
Country and year Form of ecological damage Annual costs as a 
percentage of GDP 
Burkina Fasso 1988 Crop, livestock and fuelwood losses 
from land degradation 8.8 
Costa Rica, 1989 Deforestation 7.7 
Ethiopia, 1983 Effects of deforestation on the supply of 
fuelwood and crop output 6.0 - 9.0 
Indonesia, 1984 Soil erosion and deforestation 4.0 
Madagascar, 1988 Land burning and erosion 5.0 -15.0 
Malawi, 1988 Lost crop production from soil erosion 1.6 -10.9 
Malawi, 1988 Costs of deforestation 1.2 - 4.3 
Mali, 1988 On-site soil erosion losses 0.4 
Nigeria, 1989 Soil degradation, deforestation, water 
pollution, other erosion 17.4 
Mexico, 1985 Natural resource depletion, deforestation, 
land use, environmental degradation 6 - 13 * 
Papua New Guinea, 1993 Soil degradation, erosion, deforestation, 
water pollution, other resource depletion 7 - 10 
Note: & represents percentages of Net Domestic Product. Sources: Pearce & Warford 
(1993:28); Van Tongeren et a l . (1993); Fin. Times on study on UNEP/World Bank study 
(1994) for Papua New Guinea. 
worse, stimulate environmental degradation by producers. Input subsidies like those on 
agrochemicals (pesticides, fertilisers), irrigation water and energy, lower the private 
marginal costs of these inputs below the social optimum. Linking land ownership titles 
to deforestation and land clearance also gives a wrong incentive to producers. So, 
before jumping to a PPP scheme, governments should first screen their own policy con-
sistency. The second 'external' factor which influences producer behaviour is the long-
term price trend for their products. Long periods of depressed international commodi-
ty prices in the 1980s had negative environmental consequences. It depressed income 
margins for commodity producers, lowered their investment capacity,^ and negatively 
affected fiscal revenues, thereby also limiting LDC governments margin for new envi-
ronmental policy. Stable and rewarding price levels are themselves an important, 
though not sufficiënt, condition for environmentally benign producer's behaviour. 
1) Low income margins may induce producers to refrain from environmentally desirable production methods, like investments in 
soil conservation, maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems, maintenance of the nutriënt balance of the soil. This is repeat-
edly reported to be a Standard reaction for many commodities which face depressed price levels (e.g. Akande 1993: 24). Small 
farmers have to seek for off-farm employment to maintain household income levels. The limited availability of labour power at 
their farms tends to be detrimental for all long-term maintenance activities, with often negattve environmental consequences. A 
sometimes positive effect of low income margins is the forced reduction of pesticide spraying. 
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Internalisation problems with regard to LDCprimary exports 
Only a few, comparatively rich developing countries have dared to apply a full-fledged 
PPP policy in their primary export sector. It mostly happened in cases where the export 
share of the commodity was relatively small, or, reversely, where the country had a 
large share in the world market.^ The latter condition applies in a few cases, but even 
this may not be sufficiënt to shelter a country against the competitive forces in the 
world market. A very interesting case study sterns from Malaysia where in the mid-
1980s domestic palm oil milis were confronted with increasingly tough anti-water pollu-
tion measures. Malaysia supplies eighty per cent of world palm oil exports, but palm oil 
competes with many other edible oils, so that substitution elasticities are high. The 
massive effluent problems caused by the industry have been successfully reduced due 
to the measures. The cost of this operation have mainly been borne by Malaysia's 
primary producers, the farmers and estates who grow the oil palm fresh fruit bunches. 
These producers suffered a more than 40 per cent income loss. Compared to other 
segments of the Malaysian palm oil sector, the primary producers had the lowest price 
elasticity of supply, so that most of the PPP burden was shifted to their shoulders. In 
the end, hardly any of the increased production costs were passed on to foreign con-
sumers in the form of a higher supply price (Khalid & Braden 1993). 
The preceding case shows the importance of demand and supply characteristics 
for the possibility to pass on a PPP-caused cost increase to foreign consumers. Whether 
producers or consumers bear most of the internalised environmental costs ultimately 
depends on the supply and demand characteristics. With a given supply curve it holds 
that the share of internalised costs which will be borne by consumers increases the 
more inelastic the demand curve is, and the lower the substitution elasticity is. With a 
given demand curve the opposite holds: the more inelastic the supply curve the greater 
the share which will be borne by producers (e.g. Walter 1975: 96; Dommen 1993: 9). 
This burden-sharing issue will now be considered for a broader group of primary 
commodities. 
A first crucial factor to look at is whether the price elasticity of overall world demand 
for primary commodities. Suppose the world market price is indeed increased to such 
extent that most exporters can internalise environmental costs. Wouldn't internalisa-
tion be 'paid for' by an equally large demand fall? Empirical estimates generally find a 
low price elasticity of world demand for most primary commodities (cf. Table 2). The 
inelastic world demand thus seems to offer ample scope for the internalisation of 
environmental costs. Price elasticities in the long and medium term are significantly 
less than one, often in the range between -0.10 and -0.35. For non-agricultural 
1) In 1988, 202 country shares of a total of 267 country shares in international commodity markets, were below 5 per cent, while in 
151 cases it amounted to less than 2 per cent. Only in twenty cases the country share appeared to be 20 per cent or higher 
(UNCTAD 1992: 228). 
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Table 2: Estimates of price elasticiti.es of demand for selected primary export 
commodities 
Import Short-term Long-term Substit. Source of 
country price elasti- price elasti- elasticity estimates 
Coinnodity or country city cities (cunu- (price subst. 
group lative) commodity) 
Coffee World - 0.27 A 
EC - 0.0677 - 0.107 B 
USA - 0.396 - 0.396 B 
Cocoa World - 0.19 A 
North Amer. - 0.12 - 0.227 C 
Western Eur. - 0.135 - 0.21 C 
Tea World 0.06 A 
UK - 0.03 D 
UK - 0.18 E 
Rest of Eur. - 0.15 D 
USA - 0.34 D 
USA - 0.10 (p/p*) i a> 
Banana World - 0.40 A 
Pineapple World - 2.67 A 
Sugar USA,EC,Japan - 0.04 0 
Jute Western Eur. - 0.11 - 0.44 F 
Japan - 0.18 - 0.35 F 
Cotton EEC-12 - 0.14 + 0.14 p*(pol.) G &) 
USA - 0.30 + 0.22 p*(pol.) G &) 
Ref. coooer Germany - 0.24 (p/p*) H *) 
France - 0.34 • 0.55 p*(alu.) H *) 
USA - 0.32 (p/p*) H *) 
World - 0.30 K 
Nat.rubber World - 0.20 J 
W.Europe - 0.13 *) - 0.46 ') N 
Tin World - 0.50 K 
Europe - 0.11/-0.30#) - 0.41 %) L 
TroD.timber World 
USA,EC,Japan 
- 0.16 ") 
- 0.70 
N 
0 Phosph.rock 
Notes: &) Substitute price is polyester fiber staple price; *) Substitute price is price for 
aluminium; 3) Substitute price is coffee price; #) Tin demand for respectively tin-plate use 
and non-tin-plate use; %) Refers to non-tinplate use; ") Refers to price elasticities of the 
market share of natural rubber in total demand for elastomers; ~) Non-conifer logs. 
Sources: A) Islam & Subramanian (1989:228-230); B) Akiyama & Duncan (1982a:12); C) Akiyama & 
Duncan (1982b:14); D) Akiyama & Trivedi (1987:65); E) Ramanujam (1984); F) Thigpen & Akiyima 
(1986:61); G) Coleman & Thigpen (1991:33); H) Tan (1987:18); I) Chung & Ukpong (1981); 
J) World Bank (1981b); K) Labys (1980); L) Chhabra, Grilli & Pollak (1981:1-27); H) Grilli, 
Helterline & Pollak (1981:111-30); N) LEEC (1993); 0) Karunasekera (1984). 
commodities the elasticity is often somewhat higher, namely in the range between -0.40 
and -0.60, depending inter alia on the scope for inter-commodity substitution, but these 
values would still support internalisation of environmental costs. 
The main obstacle for an application of full resource pricing to exported primary 
commodities is the high price elasticity of demand for the exports of individual coun-
tries. No empirical estimates were found of the price elasticity of commodity demand 
for individual countries. But the empirical importance of the demand effect can be 
derived along another way. In Standard partial equilibrium analysis for competitive 
markets the demand for individual producers is assumed to be infinitely elastic. At the 
equilibrium price a producer can sell all his products, but above this price level he is 
unable to sell anything, because buyers would immediately turn to other producers. If 
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country Q unilaterally increases its export supply price in the market for a homogene-
ous commodity, this will initially work out as a form of supply rationing, however small. 
At least a small price reaction will occur. If countries R,S,Treact to this small price 
increase by a more than proportional enlargement of their export supply, this will 
mean that the importers can satisfy their demand for the commodity at a price which is 
still below the supply price of country Q. The price elasticity of demand for the individ-
ual export countries will therefore be a function of the sourcing flexibility of the im-
porters and the eagerness with which other exporters will take over another country's 
market share . Given the homogeneity of most LDC primary export commodities, 
importing countries can be assumed to be highly flexible in switching between import 
sources. The competition intensity between exporters can be measured by individual 
countries' supply elasticities. If the latter are more than unity for at least some compet-
ing exporters, it may be expected that the latter will be ready to take over the market 
share of our country Q. Existing empirical estimates support the hypothesis of competi-
tive international markets. The long-term price elasticity of tin supply (worldwide, 
weighted) amounted to 1.07 according to estimates of Tan, while it amounted to 1.25 
and 1.34 for Thailand and Bolivia (1978:16). The long-term cotton acreage elasticity 
with respect to price changes amounted to 1.80 for developed countries and 0.44 for 
LDC exporters (Thigpen 1978:10). In a more recent study, the long-run price elasticity 
of cotton supply was estimated at 1.40 for Argentina and 2.46 for Australia (Coleman 
& Thigpen 1991: 58). The long-term elasticity of world soybean production with re-
spect to the world market price amounted to 275 over the period 1961-1977 (Augusto 
& Pollak 198.1: VI-15). The short-run elasticity of new tea plantings with regard to 
prices was estimated approximately 0.5 in India and Kenya, but between 1.5 and 2.0 in 
Sri Lanka and Malawi (Akiyama & Trivedi 1987). The long-term elasticity of jute 
acreage in India amounted to 1.07 according to estimates of Thigpen & Akiyama 
(1986). The long-run elasticity of coffee supply was estimated at 1.10 for Brazil and 
1.05 for Indonesia (Akiyama & Duncan 1982: 15). For cocoa and rubber the supply 
elasticities were found to be below unity,^ hinting at a less sharp international compe-
tition intensity. Another indicator of competition intensity is the supply elasticity with 
respect to idle capacity. The elasticity of primary copper supply with respect to mine 
capacity over the period 1964-1983 was estimated to be 1.20 for Chile and 1.10 for Peru 
(Tan 1987:33). 
The fierceness of competition in commodity markets on which LDCs operate, can 
be explained by objective factors. Many developing countries are highly dependent on 
1) According to Lopriore & Burger (1992:51-58) the one-year lagged elasticity of cocoa supply with respect to producer prices 
amounted to 0.24-0.65 for the major exporting countries. Akiyama & Duncun (1982:18) found similar results, both for total cocoa 
supply and for cocoa acreage. Grilli, Helterline & Pollak's estimates of short-term supply elasticities for rubber were in the range 
of 0.18-0.25 for all major exporters (1979: 20). 
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a small number of primary export commodities. These exports are vital for the foreign 
exchange earnings they need for maintaining their debt servicing capacity, and for 
secure adequate import levels of essential production inputs, fuels, and sometimes 
food. Many commodity-dependent LDCs still find themselves in debt problems. 
Table 3 presents data for a group of 73 LDCs. Debt service ratios are generally highest 
for the countries which depend most on primary commodity exports.^ The same link 
exists between commodity dependence and the incidence of debt rescheduling during a 
recent three-year period (Table 4). In the latter case oil countries form an exception. 
Apparently, their 'oil collateral' made restructuring less necessary. The overall link 
between commodity dependency and debt problems is obviously a very strong one. The 
direction of causality is open for discussion, but an important factor is certainly that 
Table 3: Debt service ratios in 1990, for a group of 73 LDCs, classified by 
commodity export dependency 
AVER. SHARE OF 
PRIHARY COHHO-
DITIES IN TOTAL 
EXPORTS ( X), 
1985-90 
DEBT SERVICE RATIOS IN 1990 
(INTREST AND DEBT REPAYMENT AS X OF HERCH.EXPORTS TOTAL NUMBER 
OF COUNTRIES 
< 10 X 10-20X 20-30% 30-40X > 40X 
* > 90X 
* 70 - 90 X 
* 50 - 70 X 
* 30 - 50 X 
* 10 - 30 X 
* < 10 X 
7 6 5 4 3 
2 9 9 2 -
5 3 2 -
1 2 4 3 1 
2 1 - -
1 1 
25 
22 
10 
11 
3 
2 
Table 4: Incidence of debt restructuring in the period 1989-1991, for a group of 
73 LDCs, classified by commodity export dependency 
AVER. SHARE OF 
PRIHARY COMMO-
DITIES IN TOTAL 
EXPORTS ( X), 
1985-90 
INCIDENCE OF DEBT RESTRUCTURING IN 1989-'91 
INCL. DEBT CANCELLING (FORGIVEN) TOTAL NUMBER 
OF COUNTRIES 
YES NO 
NON-OIL CTRY. OIL CTRY. 
* > 90X 
* 70 - 90 X 
* 50 - 70 X 
* 30 - 50 X 
* 10 - 30 X 
* < 10 X 
15 
15 
7 
7 
3 
5 5 
4 3 
3 
4 
2 
25 
22 
10 
11 
3 
2 
Sources Tables 3 and 4: calculated from World Bank, World Tables 1993; World Debt 
Tables 1992-93; World Develoment Report 1992; IMF, Financial Stat ist ics Yearbook 1992. 
1) For another indicator of indebtedness, debt to export ratios, the same picture emerges (cf. Kox 1994:41). 
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a long period of low commodity prices increased current account and debt problems.^ 
Many countries enlarged their export volume to offset the effect of the deteriorating 
terms of trade on their foreign exchange earnings, resulting in even more intense inter-
national competiticn.2^ Under these circumstances, any unilateral attempt to interna-
lise substantial environmental costs in international commodity prices will founder due 
to the strong international competition. 
PPPPhis 
The 1992 UNCED summit in Rio de Janeiro adopted a common statement in which 
internalisation of environmental costs was recommended: 'the polluter should, in prin-
ciple, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment' (UNCED 1992). The preceding pages 
raised serious doubts about the feasibility of a PPP policy with regard to the main LDC 
export sector. Adopting such statements, however important, does not even represent a 
half-way solution. It is too simplistic to take the 1972 agreement between OECD coun-
tries as a direct model for the rest of the world community in 1992. Current precondi-
tions are for two distinct reasons essentially different from those which prevailed in 
1972 for the OECD countries. 
The 1972 agreement was based on the tacit assumption that trade gains and 
losses by individual countries would by and large cancel each other out, while at the 
same time all countries would benefit from a better use of environmental resources. As 
any trade matrix shows, the OECD had and have a high proportion of intra-group 
trade. In the case of current LDC their intra-group trade as a percentage of their total 
international trade is smaller. By far the largest LDC export destination is the market 
of the OECD countries. Here LDCs compete each other with often identical products. 
Because they trade less amongst each other the scope for trade reciprocity is smaller. 
Gains and losses of PPP implementation are less easily cancelled out against each 
other. The fact that LDCs have to compete in a 'third' market makes them much more 
vulnerable for environmental dumping than individual OECD countries were in 1972. 
Environmental dumping occurs when some countries try to buy higher market shares 
by not passing on real natural resource costs or additional PPP-caused production costs 
1) The estimated cumulative loss of commodity export earnings in 1990-'92, due to price changes amounted to US$ 19 billion for 
all LDCs, which equals 15 per cent of their commodity export earnings. Of the total income loss, US$ 12 billion feil on the Ameri-
can LDCs, and USS 4.4 bln. feil on African LDCs. These amounts were equal to 21 and 24 per cent of the commodity export 
earnings of these country groups (UNCTAD 1993: 28). 
2) 'Over the last two decades, the traditional structural problems faced by commodity producers and exporters, such as price and 
earnings instability and relatively slow growth in demand , have been exacerbated by rapidly increasing supplies. The latter stem 
from increased productivity and the emergence of new and efficiënt producers, coupled with the inability of inefficiënt ones to 
diversify into other economie activities. This has been the case, in particular, for cocoa, vegetable oils and bauxite. For a wide range 
of commodities exported by developing countries, the expansion in supply has also reflected the pressure to increase exports result-
ing from the need to service large foreign debts' (UNCTAD 1993: 25). 
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to foreign buyers.^ 
A second difference between both sets of countries is that the UNCED countries 
differ much more in average income levels. With a few exceptions, the OECD coun-
tries had comparatively equal development levels. The dispersion of average income 
levels in the 1992 UNCED group is much wider.2^ An implication of this income dif-
ference is that the welfare consequences of a given PPP policy will differ sharply 
between countries. The poorer one is, the higher the marginal utility effect of a given 
income change. For the poor a current income loss due to environmental policy is a 
disproportionally heavier burden. If these welfare effects are not smoothed somehow, 
international reciprocity with regard to the internalisation of environmental costs will 
not easily come about. 
Before PPP can become the worldwide Standard for internalisation of environ-
mental costs, solutions have to be found for the environmental dumping problem and 
the differential welfare effect. The latter of both issues received most attention so far. 
Points 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration formulate in general terms that the special posi-
tion of LDCs should be accounted for with regard to the international application of 
economie Instruments and the financial consequences involved. With a few exceptions, 
among which the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting gases, this concern for the 
special position of LDCs has not yet led to innovative approaches. The importance of 
the international free ridership issue and the absence of User-Pays complementarity 
for export goods have so far been underrated.^ 
If sovereign national governments want to coordinate their actions, they can 
achieve this via international agreements, in which each country gives up small parts of 
its sovereign freedom in exchange for other countrjes doing the same. Inter-
governmental agreements create a framework that substitutes for the lack of a supra-
national regulatory authority. If the environmental problems - and the costs of solving 
them - are sufficiently general in all commodity-exporting LDCs, they have a common 
interest to try and start a multilateral initiative. Given the difference between the 
global price elasticity of international commodity demand and that for exports from 
individual countries, there is an obvious opportunity for a co-operative, multilateral 
1) The measurement of environmental dumping is still problematic with poorly developed natural resource accounts in most 
countries. The dumping concept used here refers to real, but uncounted or uncompensated natural resource costs. It would be 
wrong to narrow down the concept to compliance costs for environmental policy, since differences in compliance costs would also 
refiect different natural endowments. 
2) The GNP levels per capita (current prices) averaged at US$ 4987 for the 1992 group and US$ 3413 respectively for the 1972 
group. The Standard deviation of per capita incomes in 1992 amounted to $ 7826, while being only $ 1057 for the 1972 OECD 
countries. 
3) Refreshing exceptions can be found in Dommen (1993); Esty (1994); Andrew (1994); Zarsky (1993). At the same time a 'new 
orthodox/ has developed which wants to preclude the use of international environmental cooperation for externalities which do 
not cross national borders (e.g. Proops et al. 1993) and which ignores the free ridership issue. 
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approach. If only the 'beggar-thy-neighbour' competition can be overcome through co-
ordination, this will allow internalisation of environmental costs without large losses in 
total demand volume. This is a hope-giving circumstance for international initiatives to 
make the User-Pays principle work. The developed countries with their concern for 
environmental dumping, will be interested as well. 
A potentially fruitful internalisation approach is the use of voluntary ecolabels to 
distinguish commodities which have been produced in an environmentally benign way 
(e.g. Jha et al. 1993). Implementation is however fraught with difficulties (label misuse, 
limited willingness to pay of consumers, diversity of national standards). For commodi-
ty markets it is highly doubtful whether the ecolabels can ever become a widely used 
instrument, because of the homogeneity of most commodities and because of the fact 
that most commodities do not directly enter consumption. Another interesting propos-
al for internalisation is to apply lower import tariffs for goods produced in an environ-
mentally sustainable way (e.g. Zarsky 1993). For primary commodities it is, however, 
not very practical, because tariffs on primary commodities are alredy close to zero. We 
will here concentrate on the potential contribution of a third instrument to regulate the 
issues at hand, vz. International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements (Kox 
1994; 1991). 
International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements (ICREAs) 
ICREAs are voluntary agreements between countries to regulate particular aspects of 
the internalisation of commodity-specific environmental externalities. They are de-
signed as co-operative solutions to the international market failure problem with 
regard to these externalities. ICREAs owe their tongue-breaking name to the desire to 
differentiate them from most existing international environmental agreements which 
do not have a commodity-specific character.^ like most other international environ-
mental instrument, they can only complement, and certainly not substitute for envi-
ronmental policy by governments of commodity-producing countries. ICREAs fully 
respect the sovereignty of governments in exporting countries, while offering them 
possibilities to reconcile environmental targets with their macro-economie constraints. 
Although priority ranking can be subject to negotiation, the basic objectives of this type 
of agreements are likely to be: 
* to temporarily relieve (part of) the international competitive pressures, so that 
exporting countries can introducé environmental policies in their export sector, 
without initially losing market share and export earnings; 
* effectuate (full) resource pricing for export primary commodities; 
1) International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements must be clearly distinguished from 'old-style' international 
commodity agreements. The latter aimed at commodity price stabilisation, which is not an objective of ICREAs, even though a 
stable and rewarding commodity price would probably facilitate the introduction of environmentally sound production methods. 
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* bring about a transition process towards ecologically sound production methods; 
* support governments of the poorer LDCs in shaping an ecological policy towards 
the commodity export sector. 
A fifth objective can be to contribute to export diversification programmes in LDCs 
where natural preconditions are not fit for producing the commodity in an environmen-
tally sound way, but where a lack of alternative foreign exchange sources would other-
wise impede the diversification process. 
The ultimate form of an ICREA can be adapted to different market situations, 
production conditions, and production costs structures. Two basic variants will be 
mentioned here. The first one is a standard-setting variant. It is an agreement between 
countries to apply common standards with regard to production technology. The 
second variant is a transfer ICREA with a financial compensation mechanism. It 
operates through a compensation fund, fed from agreed contributions from importing 
countries. In both cases the agreements are created for a particular time period, suffi-
ciently long for the majority of LDC exporters to adopt environmental policies and 
environmentally preferable production methods. Afterwards, the latter will have 
become the Standard for international cost prices and export prices. From then on-
wards things can be left to market forces again. In some cases it may be necessary to 
maintain some form of international monitoring to avoid backsliding to old practices. 
Standard-setting ICREA 
In a standard-setting agreement exporting countries agree certain technology-related 
environmental standards for a specific commodity over an agreed-upon transition 
period. By doing so they can avoid undercutting each other's prices through a 
continued use of cheaper, but environmentally damaging production methods. An 
example would be an agreement to ban a particular damaging production method, or 
an agreement to apply common minimum norms for environmental quality in 
production regions. The movement towards full resource princing is achieved through 
the possibility of synchronously introduced sound (but more expensive) new production 
methods or through synchronously banning old, damaging methods. In either case this 
will result, all things being equal, in a price jump.^ 
The exporting countries can conclude a cartel-like agreement, in which the co-opera-
tion of importing countries is not required. However, if the cartel coalition is unstable, 
it might be very helpful to obtain the participation of the main importing countries, 
because this could help to maintain discipline. 
1) The intioduction of the new production methods should avoid to create additional supply stimuli. Otherwise, an excess supply 
could be evoked which, through short-term price reactions, would hampers the establishment of resource cost-based equilibrium 
prices. 
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Transfer type ICREA 
The transfer variant is characterised by a different, more direct mechanism for imple-
menting the User Pays Principle. A compensation fund is created from financial con-
tributions by importing countries. The annual contribution of the importing countries is 
proportional to (a) their net import volume of the commodity, and (b) their per capita 
income level. The exporting LDCs may draw on this fund for financing projects and 
programmes which improve the environmental record of the commodity involved. The 
drawing rights of LDC exporters must be proportional to their export volume. The use 
of funds may differ between countries, according to their natural preconditions and 
environmental policy priorities (e.g. erosion abatement, avoiding water pollution by 
pesticides). In any case it should be in conformity to a funding mandate which is agreed 
upon by the participating countries. Some monitoring is necessary to secure that proper 
use is made of the funds. Repeated abuse should result in exclusion from further funds, 
or even in trade sanctions by importing countries. 
The magnitude of the ICREA Fund can be derived by taking incremental costs in a 
reference country as starting point, or much easier, by a rule-of-the-thumb method, say 
3-10 per cent of a trend price.^ How the import countries collect their contribution 
for the compensation fund is up to them. Several forms are possible, which differing in 
the degree to which they effectuate the User Pays principle: a levy on domestic 
commodity use, contribution from general tax receipts, or even an import levy (provid-
ed this is made consistent with GATT/WTO obligations). 
Some operational issues 
Some general issues are critical to the relevance of ICREAs. The causality links 
between commodity production and the occurrence of negative environmental impacts 
must well-established, and must occur rather generally in major commodity-exporting 
LDCs. Furthermore, domestic government policy should not form the main cause 
(incentive) for the negative environmental consequences of commodity production. 
Technological alternatives for current polluting or resource depleting production 
methods must be available, either in the form of process improvements, or in the form 
of 'after-process' neutralisation measures. Implementation of the alternative technolo-
gies must have a more than trivial consequence for unit costs or government budgets. 
Otherwise national policy measures can easily be taken without the necessity of inter-
national co-ordination. No generalisations are allowed about the cost effect of their 
implementation, due to the lack of empirical evidence. The available case studies show 
mixed results (c.f. page 7-8 of this paper). In some cases the increases in operational 
1) In some markets with volatile prices the additional user costs may even go unnoticed. The issue of the appropriate size of an 
ICREA Fund is elaborated on in Kox (1994) which is available from the author on request. 
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and investment costs are very modest, so that the producers themselves could probably 
absorb the cost effect. In other cases, like cotton, unit cost increases of thirty per cent 
and higher were registered. Further empirical studies are necessary here. 
The participation issue is particularly important, since this type of agreement 
aims at finding a way out from the international free ridership problem. ICREAs are 
agreements between sovereign governments and participation should therefore be 
based on positive incentives rather than (negative) sanctions). Nonetheless, the risk of 
free ridership by exporting or importing countries has to be taken into consideration. 
The following considerations hold for transfer ICREAs. For exporting countries the 
financial transfers form the most important incentive for participation. A possible 
ineentive for price undercutting by non-participating export countries disappears when 
the import countries charge the levy on commodity use on a generic basis, i.e. without 
discriminating for country of origin. It can be necessary in some cases to allow side 
payments from the Fund for the environmentally most disadvantaged countries, e.g. 
for export diversification out of this commodity. Non-participation by import countries 
is discouraged when the export countries charge a higher price for non-participating 
import countries, with the differential being channelled back to the ICREA Fund. 
Parallel markets between non-participating import and export countries can only be 
abated with political pressure, and possibly, with financial pressure and/or trade sanc-
tions.^ Positive incentives are much more preferable, however. 
The participation of importing countries would substantiate the general policy princi-
ples which most of them subscribed to in the context of the 1992 UNCED conference. 
An enlightened self-interest can also bring them to participate, since several transbor-
der externalities - physical and psychological - are involved, certainly in a long-term 
view. It is beyond doubt that feedback loops exist between the abundance of environ-
mental resources and world market prices (e.g. price levels of tropical timber and many 
fish varieties). Commodity-importing countries may be better off by now facing a 
moderate import cost increase instead of huge costs increases in the future. 
Apprópriateness conditions 
Many aspects of the feasibility and apprópriateness of ICREAs can only be established 
on a commodity-by-commodity basis. The importance of in-depth studies for individual 
commodities has been stressed already. In the absence of empirical studies we per-
1) The use of trade sanctions against free riders in the context of international environmental agreements (IEA) is subject of 
intensive debate within the WTO. Some IEA, like the Montreal protocol, the CTTES treaty and the Basel Agreement, contain 
trade sanctions against free riders. The crucial issue is that trade-affecting environmental measures should not be used to cover up 
'ordinary' trade protectionism, and should not affect international trade in an unnecessarily restrictive way. A central message from 
the UNCED conference in Rio was that trade and environment policies should be mutually supportive. Agenda 21 explicitly stated 
that the accomplishment of "an open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable multilateral trading system" would 
represent a large step in this direction. 
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formed simulations with a four-country, one commodity model in order to investigate 
the effects of ICREAs in several ecological and market situations (Kox 1994). Simula-
tions were always run for a period of twenty years. With the proviso that a generalisa-
tion of simulation results is always somewhat tricky, the following conclusions were 
drawn. Standard-setting ICREAs appeared to be most fit when the following (non-
additive) conditions prevailed: 
* discrete options in the production technology can be discerned; 
* low (average) price elasticity of import demand; 
* absence of sharp inter-country cost differences for environmentally sound produced 
commodities; 
* governments of exporting countries have an outspoken preference for a clean 
environment, and are prepared to accept that a limited negative impact on produc-
er profits and government budget is a necessary price for an improved environment. 
Appropriateness conditions for the transfer agreements appeared to be less restrictive 
than those for the standard-setting variant. Transfer agreements can be applied in all 
cases where standard-setting ICREAs are possible, but also when the following condi-
tions exist: 
* import demand is highly price elastic, but the contributions for the Fund are levied 
in a way that does not have a direct impact on import demand levels, e.g. by the use 
of general taxes); 
* situations where marked inter-country differences exist in costs of sustainable 
commodity production, but the 'environmentally advantaged' country is prepared to 
share some of its foreign exchange gains with the disadvantaged country in order to 
'buy' participation of the latter; 
* the most important importing countries join the agreement, while non-participating 
import countries are charged a differentiated (higher) supply price by the exporting 
member-countries. 
ICREAs and PPP 
One may raise the question whether International Commodity-Related Environmental 
Agreements are compatible with the intention of the PPP guidelines. Indeed, the 
guidelines explicitly state that aid to polluters should be avoided, because this would 
reward wrongdoers and create a false incentive structure. Doesn't the ICREA concept, 
at least the transfer variant, violate this rule? At first sight it does. We have, however, 
sketched that application of PPP to vital export sectors is highly unlikely, when it could 
possibly affect their export eamings. The problem is aggravated by presence of unequal 
welfare effects, caused by widely diverging per capita incomes. ICREAs seek to deal 
with this stalemate situation by repairing the 'user-pays complement' of PPP in an 
international context. They promote the internalisation of environmental externalities 
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in the prices of internationally traded goods, and hence, create a basis for a more effi-
ciënt international allocation of trade and resources. In fact this approach represent a 
forrn of enhanced PPP or 'PPP Plus'. 
The original PPP guidelines explicitly allow for an ICREA-type measures. In a 
supplementary declaration on the implementation of the PPP the OECD countries 
agreed that in case of a speedy, sudden or very extensive implementation of environ-
mental policy, environmental improvements may be helped and even speeded up if 
existing polluters are given aid in their initial or transitional efforts to reduce their 
emissions (OECD 1972, 1974). The aid payments for such purposes should form part 
of a transitional arrangement for a specified time period, provided they do not lead tot 
significant distortions in international trade and investment.^ The PPP implementa-
tion guidelines also state that when steps to protect the environment would jeopardise 
the social and economie policy objectives of a country or region, e.g. by adding to inter-
regional imbalances or causing unemployment, financial aid to such regions or coun-
tries would not run counter the intentions of PPP, again provided that some conditions 
are met.2^ Finally, the implementation guidelines state that aid given to promote 
research and development in poUution control technologies or poUution abatement 
equipment is not considered inconsistent with PPP. A transfer ICREA could very well 
financiaUy contribute to such research in the export countries. 
Conckision 
Internalisation of environmental costs in the prices of internationally traded goods is 
increasingly getting attention in world trade negotiations. Indeed, when no co-
operative, multilateral solutions are created for this issue, current trends suggest that 
unilateral solutions will be sought after. These are likely to have the form of protec-
tionist measures to offset the real or imaginary competitive consequences of a differ-
ence in environmental compliance costs. The welfare costs of such measures have been 
sufficiently documented. It is not international trade as such which causes externalities, 
so there is no reason to suppress trade. Moreover, from an efficiency point of view, it is 
rather bizarre to request equalisation of environmental compliance costs through trade 
measures, since the cost differences may very well reflect better or worse natural 
preconditions for the production of certain goods. It is therefore to be hoped that new 
1) The recommendation adds that the conditionality for aid given to new plants should be more stricter even, in order to prevent 
distortion of competition. In the case of LDC primary exports we could add the concern that such aid could exert an undesired 
supply incentive. 
2) The implementation guidelines recommend that the exceptions are: (a) kept to the level and for the time strictly necessary to 
reach the specific socio-economic objectives; (b) strictly selective, i.e. they should restrict assistance for poUution control to only 
those sectors, areas or plants where otherwise severe difficulties would occur, and (c) not creating significant distortions in inter-
national trade and investment (OECD 1972,1974). 
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co-operative sohitions to the internalisation problem for internationally traded goods 
will come about. The 1992 UNCED summit in Rio de Janeiro called for a worldwide 
application of the Polluter Pays Principle as a central guideline for the internalisation 
of envïronmental costs. It has been shown for the case of LDC primary exports that this 
recommendation is not even a half-way solution. New international institutions, like for 
example International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements, are needed to 
overcome the remaining difficulties of the transition period and the differential welfare 
effects. Such new institutions, particularly the transfer type ICREAs, may enable LDC 
governrnents to implement now, rather than in a far future, the necessary environmen-
tal policies. Technological and financial assistance, vaguely promised in the Rio decla-
ration, is also helpful in building up necessary environmental expertise in LDCs. So far, 
there is fairly broad disappointment among LDCs and environmentalists about the 
financial commitments pledged by developed countries. With regard to the primary 
exports of developing countries International Commodity-Related Environmental 
Agreements offer a promising way to substantiate the principle that polluters and users 
have to pay for a better environment. 
ANNEX: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF PRIMARY COMMODITYPRODUCTION 
The main environmental externalities of primary commodity production which occur due to the now 
dominant production technologies, can be described for six commodity groups (tree crops, field crops, 
livestock, tropical forestry, fishing and mining commodities). The summary is based upon a large number 
of publications and research findings which for reasons of brevity cannot be mentioned here. Full refer-
ences can be found in Kox (1994) and Kox, Van der Tak & De Vries (1993). 
* Tree crops, like coffee, bananas, palm oil, cocoa and rubber often have negative as well as positive 
environmental consequences. Trees protect soils against eroding, which is especially important in hilly 
areas. Their shadow is important for water conservation and humidity regulation. Furthermore, trees 
provide nitrogen-fixing services, a carbon sink function., and a natural habitat for several forms of animal 
life. Negative environmental effects are linked with ample use of insecticides, fungicides, nematocides and 
other pesticides. These cause polluted run-off into rivers, lakes and seas, leaching into groundwater, 
human health damage, and damage to numerous wildlife species. In the construction phase of tree erop 
plantations large areas are deforested, with strong temporary erosion effects. In some regions nearly all 
primary forest has been disappeared for tree erop cultivation. 
* Field crops, like cotton, soya, sugar, tobacco and tapioca, tend to have a much more negative 
impact on their natural environment. Areas with field crops lose more water due to evaporation and often 
require irrigation. Erosion damage is widespread and, since harvesting often implies total removal of 
vegetation, natural replenishment cycles are broken, so that field crops tend to require more input of 
chemical fertilizers. Intensive use of agrochemicals (biocides, chemical growth regulators, chemical ferti-
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lizers) contributes to pollution of the subsoil and surface waters. Some agrochemicals, depending on their 
application rates and appropriateness for local conditions, cause cumulative long-term effects in the form 
of pesticide residuals in animal and human food chains and diminishing biodiversity. Use of pesticides is 
self-propagating, since growing numbers of pests have developed resistance against Standard pesticides. 
* Livestock grazing. Some forms of extensive livestock grazing, particularly pastoralism, can be 
appropriate and more sustainable forms of land use than cropping, depending on local circumstances and 
grazing intensity. Forest clearing for extensive farming methods has widely encroached into habitats for 
wildlife. It can cause fast deterioration of soil qualities. If cattle ranching in arid zones exceeds natural 
carrying capacities, it disturbs the delicate ecological balance by depleting vegetation and water resources, 
and by compacting and eroding soils. Intensive farming methods contribute to water and air pollution by 
nitrate deposits. 
* Tropical foresby. Massive deforestation in the Amazon region, in South-East Asia and in certain 
parts of Africa cannot be traced back to a single cause. In some areas, however, the commercial extrac-
tion of tropical timber forms a major cause. The direct economie consequences of deforestation are not 
confined to the depletion of future timber sources. It also diminishes possibilities for non-timber means 
of existence for the indigenous populations. 
* Mining tends to have several negative environmental effects. In the excavation and ore removal 
phase of production the most common problems are: destruction of plant and animal habitat; land 
subsidence; erosion, silting of lakes and streams; dust pollution; tracé metal pollution; giant waste heaps; 
acid drainage and metal contamination of lakes, streams and groundwater. Open-cast mining contributes 
heavily to soil erosion by demolition of vegetation and soil structure. In the ore concentration phase of 
production the most common problems are: waste generation (tailings); organic chemical contamination 
(residues of chemicals used in concentrators); acid drainage (sulphur in ore) and metal contamination of 
lakes, streams and groundwater. The smelting and refining phase of production is very energy-intensive, 
causes air pollution (e.g. emissions of sulphur dioxide, arsenic, lead, cadmium), and generates waste. 
* Fishery. Overintense fishing of coastal waters and deep sea areas, often by international fishery 
companies, negatively affects the regeneration capacity of fish populations. Alarming reports have been 
published recently on the sharp rate of depletion of many popular species both in the tropic and moderate 
zones. Commercial high-capacity fishing fleets, often with processing facilities on board, roam the world 
seas to find new species which can be fished as replacement. Even species with very slow regeneration 
cycles - and therefore vulnerable for extinction - are now being fished. Large quantities of 'by-catch' (less 
valuable species) are still destroyed without being offered for consumption. Some fishery practices con-
tribute to devastation of the coral reefs and the sea bottom. Intensive fish farming (e.g. shrimp farming) 
can cause considerable local water pollution and degradation of coastal mangrove forests. 
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